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Abstract

The CATS project provides infrastructure for a rigorous evidence-based improvement of cybersecurity
education. The CCI permits comparisons of different
instructional methods by assessing how well students
learned the core concepts of the field (especially adversarial thinking), where instructional methods refer to how material is taught (e.g., lab-based, casestudies, collaborative, competitions, gaming). Specifically, the CCI is a tool that will enable researchers to
scientifically quantify and measure the effect of their
approaches to, and interventions in, cybersecurity education.
Index terms— Cybersecurity Assessment Tools
(CATS), cybersecurity education, Cybersecurity
Concept Inventory (CCI).

We report on the status of our Cybersecurity Assessment Tools (CATS) project that is creating and validating a concept inventory for cybersecurity, which
assesses the quality of instruction of any first course
in cybersecurity. In fall 2014, we carried out a Delphi process that identified core concepts of cybersecurity. In spring 2016, we interviewed twenty-six
students to uncover their understandings and misconceptions about these concepts. In fall 2016, we
generated our first assessment tool–a draft Cybersecurity Concept Inventory (CCI), comprising approximately thirty multiple-choice questions. Each question targets a concept; incorrect answers are based on
observed misconceptions from the interviews. This
year we are validating the draft CCI using cognitive
interviews, expert reviews, and psychometric testing. 1 Introduction
In this paper, we highlight our progress to date in
In the coming years, America will need to educate
developing the CCI.
an increasing number of cybersecurity professionals.
But how will we know if the preparatory courses are
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effective? Presently there is no rigorous, researchElectrical Engineering
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based method for measuring the quality of cyber3 Computer Science
security instruction. Validated assessment tools are
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ports [PDH+ 16, SDH+ 16, SSD+ 16, THS+ 17].4

needed so that cybersecurity educators have trusted
methods for discerning whether efforts to improve
student preparation are successful. The Cybersecurity Assessment Tools (CATS) project is developing
rigorous instruments that can measure student learning and identify best practices. The first CAT will be
a Cybersecurity Concept Inventory (CCI) that measures how well students understand basic concepts in
cybersecurity (especially adversarial thinking) after a
first course in the field.
Cybersecurity is a vital area of growing importance for national competitiveness, and national reports reveal a growing need for cybersecurity professionals [FS15]. As educators wrestle with this demand, there is a corresponding awareness that we
lack a rigorous research base that informs how to
meet that demand. Existing certification exams, such
as CISSP [cis], are largely informational, not conceptual. We are not aware of any scientific studies of
any of these tests. The CATS Project is developing
rigorous assessment tools for assessing and evaluating
educational practices.
Since fall 2014, we have been following prescriptions of the National Research Council for developing
rigorous and valid assessment tools [PCG01, PB14,
HCZL14, SMSR+ 11]. Our work is inspired in part by
the Force Concept Inventory [HWS92], which helped
transform and improve physics education to employ
more active learning methods.
We carried out two surveys using the Delphi
process to identify the scope and content of the
CATs [PDH+ 16]. We then used qualitative interviews
to develop a cognitive theory that can guide the construction of assessment questions [SSD+ 16, THS+ 17].
Based on these interviews, we developed a preliminary battery of approximately thirty assessment
items for the CCI. Each item focuses on one of the
top five rated concepts (on importance) from our CCI
Delphi process. The distractors (incorrect answers)
for each assessment item are based on student misconceptions observed during the interviews.
In this paper we provide a status report on the
CATS project, highlighting our results from the Delphi process, student interviews, and our development
of draft multi-choice questions. Examples illustrate
our method. For more details, see our project re-
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Indentifying
Core
Concepts
through a Delphi Process

In fall 2014, we carried out two Delphi processes aimed at identifying core cybersecurity topics [PDH+ 16]. A Delphi process solicits input from
a set of subject matter experts to create consensus
about contentious decisions [GGH+ 10]. Topics are refined and prioritized over several rounds, where participants share comments without attribution so that
the logic of a contributed remark is most significant.
The first process was for the CCI, which is for students completing any first course in cybersecurity.
The second process was for a Cybersecurity Curriculum Assessment (CCA), which is for students graduating from college about to enter the workforce as cybersecurity professionals. Here, we focus on the CCI.
We conducted each process electronically, through
emails between Delphi leaders and the panel of experts, and through web forms to collect survey data.5
We carried out five rounds for CCI and four for CCA.
To the authors’ knowledge, these are the first Delphi
processes for cybersecurity to identify core concepts.
A total of thirty-six experts participated in the initial topic generation phase, including thirty-three for
the CCI process. The selected experts constitute a
diverse group of men and women from over a dozen
US states and Canada, working as cybersecurity authors, educators, and professionals from industry and
government [PDH+ 16]. Each expert holds a PhD in a
cybersecurity-related field and teaches cybersecurity,
or works as a cybersecurity professional. The project
website lists the experts and their affiliations.6
Experts rated CCI and CCA topics according to
three distinct metrics: (1) Importance, (2) Difficulty,
and (3) Timelessness using a 1–10 Likert scale, where
10 is the greatest. If an expert chose to rate a topic
outside the interquartile range, they were asked to
provide a written justification for their deviation from
4 Parts

of this paper are drawn from these reports.
Delphi leaders were Sherman and Parekh, who consulted with Herman who has notable experience with this process.
6 http://cisa.umbc.edu/cats/
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Table 1: Top five reconciled CCI topics sorted by median importance (I) and then by median difficulty (D),
as rated by the Delphi experts using a 1-10 Likert scale where 10 is the greatest.
Topic
Identify vulnerabilities and failures
Identify attacks against CIAa triad and authentication
Devise a defense
Identify the security goals
Identify potential targets and attackers
a CIA

I
9
9
9
9
9

D
8
8
7
6
5

refers to confidentiality, integrity, availability.

the consensus. These comments enabled dissenting
experts to sway the majority. Once the deadline
for the round passed, the Delphi leaders compiled
summary statistics for each topic. These descriptive
statistics and data visualization provided the Delphi
leaders with information about the level of consensus.
Responses from the first rounds of CCI and CCA
were unexpectedly similar; though, adversarial thinking was a prevalent theme among CCI responses. To
ensure that CCI was headed in a distinct direction
from CCA, a second topic identification round was
performed for CCI only. Delphi leaders asked participants to provide topics focused on adversarial thinking, which the Delphi leaders and the experts felt constitutes a vital core of cybersecurity. The restarted
CCI process produced thirty topics.
Table 1 lists the top five topics from the CCI process sorted by median importance. The main contribution of this phase of the project is a numerical
rating of the importance and difficulty of concepts in
cybersecurity. It is prudent to identify topics that are
difficult, since those topics may provide the greatest
barriers to mastery. These ratings can be used to
identify core concepts—cross-cutting ideas that connect knowledge in the discipline—which can guide
the design of curriculum, assessment tools, and other
educational materials and policies.
The results of the Delphi processes, especially the
CCA process, identified a range of specialized topics,
reflecting the broad, multi-faceted aspects of cybersecurity. This range of facets can make prioritizing
content in cybersecurity education difficult and make
it difficult for students to discern how topics connect.

The five topics rated most important by the Delphi
experts in CCI stand out as important and timeless
concepts that can create priorities in instruction and
help students organize their learning.
In addition, these results help clarify, distill, and
articulate what is cybersecurity, which this project
sees as the management of information and trust in
an adversarial cyber world.
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Uncovering Misconceptions by Interviewing Students

To study how students reason about core cybersecurity concepts, in spring 2016, we conducted twentysix think-aloud interviews with cybersecurity students who had completed at least one course in cybersecurity [SSD+ 16, THS+ 17]. We recruited these students from three diverse institutions: University of
Maryland, Baltimore County, Prince George’s Community College, and Bowie State University. During the interviews, students grappled with security
scenarios designed to probe student understanding
of cybersecurity, especially adversarial thinking. No
prior research has documented student misconceptions about cybersecurity concepts nor how they use
adversarial models to guide their reasoning.
Drawing upon the five topics from the CCI Delphi process, we developed a set of twelve engaging
cybersecurity scenarios, organized into three semistructured interview protocols. These scenarios were
not formally vetted by external experts. Each interview lasted about one hour during which an interviewer asked the student to identify and scruti3

nize security concerns for each of four scenarios. We
audio- and video-recorded each interview and produced a written transcript. In addition, we saved
any diagrams drawn by the student. We analyzed
student statements using a structured qualitative
method, novice-led paired thematic analysis, to document student misconceptions and problematic reasonings [HZL12, MHB+ 15].
The following excerpt illustrates a typical exchange
that took place during an interview. In the given scenario, the interviewer presents evidence of a possible
SQL injection attack vulnerability, one of the most
common software security issues.

the end of a set of strings as part of the query its
data in the query. ∎

Among other issues, this exchange illustrates the
following theme that we commonly observed: incorrect assumptions—failure to see vulnerabilities and
limiting the adversary. The student incorrectly asserts that it would be sufficient to implement a defense at the client side, apparently failing to appreciate that an adversary might attack the server and/or
that the client might be malicious.
In addition, the student’s focus on the client (with
less attention to the server) suggests a user bias, perhaps because the student’s experience may have primarily been as a user. Such a limited mental perspective can blind the student to vulnerabilities in other
aspects of the system and lead to inappropriate conclusions.

Scenario A3: Database Input Error.
Interviewer 1: When a user Mike O’Brien registered
a new account for an online shopping site, he was required to provide his username, address, first and last
name. Immediately after Mike submitted his request,
you–as the security engineer–receive a database input
error message in the logs. What might you infer from
this error message?
Subject: It’s very costly to implement security at the
server level. But at the client side, SQL injection
methods are used by hackers to get into database.
Simple queries, like avoiding special characters, which
can be used for hacking, can be avoided.
Interviewer 1: Would it be sufficient for them to add
that sort of input checking at the computer?
Subject: Client level, yeah. Implementing security at
the client level is easier than in database and server
level. Because at server level the cost is insane.
Subject: . . . I would say somebody is trying to do
SQL? When they are trying to gain access to someone’s account by adding in a piece of SQL that would
always return true, but there are ways to do that too.
Interviewer 2: How would you do it?
Subject: You would not allow certain characters to
say username, password field or you would make sure
that there is enough quotations around the password,
so the if someone were to try to break out of the
quotations whatever content the user entered would
be escaped. So you wouldn’t accent a quote as a raw
quote but an escaped character, so that the query
database system would know that the quote is not

In addition to the themes of incorrect assumptions
and biases, we also commonly observed two additional themes: over generalizations and conflating
concepts. For example, some students stated that no
Internet communications are secure; others seemed
to believe that use of biometrics always greatly enhances the strength of authentication systems. We
observed students conflating many concepts, including, for example, authorization and authentication,
hashing and encryption, and threat and risk.
Biases we observed include user, physical, and personal. For example, some students assumed that
physical security is usually stronger than software security. Others assumed that data security is usually stronger in the USA than in other countries.
These biased assumptions are not necessarily true,
and there is not always a clean boundary separating the referenced categories (e.g., the security of
software systems depends in part on the security of
hardware components, and hackers often cross international boundaries electronically).
In a companion paper [SDH+ 16], we discuss answers to six of our scenarios, to provide instructive
case studies for students and educators.
4

Scenario A3. When a user Mike O’Brien registered
a new account for an online shopping site, he was reBuilding on the CCI Dephi process, scenarios, and quired to provide his username, address, first and last
student interviews, we developed thirty draft CCI name. Immediately after Mike submitted his request,
multiple-choice questions of varying difficulty. For you–as the security engineer–receive a database input
each of the twelve scenarios, we developed one or error message in the logs.
more questions. Each question targets one of the
top five topics identified in the CCI Delphi process. Question A3-3. Choose the best defense to protect
Each question has exactly one best answer, and the against possible security problems suggested by this
distractor (incorrect) choices are inspired, whenever error:
possible, by commonly observed misconceptions from A. Sanitize input at the server side.
the interviews.
We developed these assessment items through a B. Place security controls at the client side.
collaborative iterative process while seated around a
C. Require all characters to be from a restricted set
conference table. Our team included experts in cyof characters.
bersecurity and education, including professors and
graduate students. We endeavored to follow best D. Implement the system in a secure programming
practices for creating multiple choice questions, inlanguage.
cluding heeding the “Vanderbilt advice” [Bra]. It was
helpful to revisit draft questions periodically to revise E. Test the software more thoroughly before deploying it.
and polish them. Everyone discovered that producing high-quality questions is challenging.
Figure 1: A sample CCI assessment item associated
The representative draft question in Figure 1 ilwith Scenario A-3 (database input error).
lustrates the results of our process. This question
targets the topic of devising a defense in the context of the database input error scenario introduced five questions, five per topic.
in Section 3.
In addition, we plan to continue development of
Distractor B is inspired by the misconception dis- the CCA. The next step is to develop draft questions.
cussed for the interview excerpt from Section 3. The We envision that the CCA will target the same topics
other distractors are not bad actions to include, but from the CCI but at greater technical depth.
they alone do not mitigate the vulnerability. AlterThe CATS project is meeting the need for rigorous
native A is clearly the best choice among incomplete evidence-based assessment tools to inform the develalternatives.
opment of best practices in cybersecurity education.
In particular, the CCI will enable researchers to scientifically quantify and measure the effect of their
5 Next Steps
approaches to first courses in cybersecurity. We welThis year we will validate our draft CCI multiple- come feedback on our work, and we would be dechoice questions using cognitive interviews, expert lighted to hear from any researcher who might like to
reviews, and psychometric testing. First, we will participate in our study.
carry out a pilot study seeking feedback from at least
twenty experts and administering the CCI to at least
6 Acknowledgments
200 students. We will use the results to revise and
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